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10 Abstract 
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12 Attempts to address the resource curse remain focussed on revenue   management, 
13 
14 seeking technical solutions to political problems over examinations of relations    of 
15 
16 power. In this paper, we provide a review of the contribution   anthropological 
17 
18 
research has made over the past decade to understanding the dynamic interplay   of 
20 
21 social relations, economic interests and struggles over power at stake in   the 
22 
23 political economy of extraction. In doing so, we show how the constellation    of 
24 
25 subaltern and elite agency at work within processes of resource extraction is   vital 
26 
27 
in order to confront the complexities, incompatibilities, and inequities in   the 
28 
29 
30 exploitation of mineral  resources. 
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41 Initially conceived as a counter theory to explain the failure of resource abundant    low and 
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43 middle-income economies to benefit from the boons of their mineral wealth (Auty, 1993), the 
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In conventional accounts of the resource curse, the ‘petrodollar’ has become something of a 
metonym for the complex of extractive and financial processes that are commonly seen to 
foster the culture of greed, corruption, violence and economic exploitation that erodes 
political stability (Coronil, 1997; Karl, 1997). Examples include, the role of the petrodollar in 
financing Angola’s civil war (Global Witness, 1999; Shaxson, 2007); provoking corruption, 
insecurity and ‘petroviolence’ in the Niger Delta (Watts, 2001); and boosting elite power and 
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1 
2 
3 are commonly classified as weak or fragile states (Shaxson, 2007); and on the other side,    to 
4 
5 the unaccountable, inequitable and at times corrupt, mismanagement of resource revenues    by 
6 
7 
political elites. Here, oil extraction is particularly (though not exclusively) and   critically 
8 
9 
10 scrutinised. Due to the direct impact of oil prices on the global economy and    financial 
11 
12 markets, oil has received the lion’s share    of scholarly interest and policy focus in relation to 
13 
14 resource curse debates. Conversely, mining, as opposed to oil, has    historically grabbed the 
15 
16 greater share of anthropological interest and ethnographic research. The intimate   and 
17 
18 
essential connection of mineral extraction to colonial projects,    has meant that mining has long 
20 
21 occupied a significant role (whether as backdrop or centre stage) in the anthropological    work 
22 
23 tracking processes of agrarian change and social transformation, proletarianisation,    ecological 
24 
25 destruction and commodification (see for example, Nash, 1979; Taussig, 1980; Harris, 1989). 
26 
27 
The practice of mining is deeply territorial, as is the kind of social authority which    many 
28 
29 
30 mining companies exert in the localities where they operate, and it is arguably   this 
31 
32 territoriality and the ways in which it shapes the lifeworlds of mineworkers and    mining 
33 
34 communities that has animated ethnographers for so long (see Gordon, 1977; Carstens, 2001). 
35 
36 Anthropologists have come rather more recently to studying the politics and    social economies 
37 
38 
of oil, seeking to interrogate empirically the distinct kinds of petroviolence, conflict    and 
40 
41 insecurity that are commonly associated with oil  extraction. 
42 
43 
44 
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1 
2 
3 military strength in Chad (Behrends & Hoinathy, 2014). Weak governance in    Petrostates has 
4 
5 thus come to exemplify a key factor in ‘the curse’ placing unaccountable revenue    payments, 
6 
7 
corruption and ‘rent-seeking’ (misappropriation of funds by elites at all levels) at   the 
8 
9 
10 forefront of academic investigation and analysis. At the same time,    good governance was 
11 
12 established as the development orthodoxy of the 1990s and 2000s; while accountability in the 
13 
14 payment and management of resource revenues emerged as arguably the single biggest    issue 
15 
16 for extractive companies operating in fragile states and a focal point of the   industry’s 
17 
18 
corporate social responsibility (CSR)  agenda
1
. 
20 
21 
22 
23 Two decades on and the resource curse remains the subject of intense debate no longer just 
24 
25 within development economics (Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999; Collier & Goderis, 2007;    Segal, 
26 
27 
2012) and political economy (Idemudia, 2010; Osuoka & Zalik, 2010) but within    the 
28 
29 
30 disciplines of Sociology, Human Geography, and Anthropology,    the last of which is the focus 
31 
32 of this paper. Indeed, the latest millennial scramble    for resources, and concomitant boom in 
33 
34 profits on the back of surging metals prices which reached its apogee in the early 2000s,    has 
35 
36 brought fresh impetus to discussions of the resource curse, and whether this boom    will 
37 
38 
provide meaningful opportunities for ‘transformative development’ (Collier, 2008, p.    3). 
40 
41 
42 
43 Meanwhile, although the dominant focus of scholarship on this millennial scramble    is 
44 
45 minerals and energy, new frontiers are opening in the rush for resources, and with them new 
46 
47 
areas of enquiry open into the pursuit and plunder of plant and animal life from    microscopic 
48 
49 
50 genes to land itself (Thompson, 2008; Fairhead, Leach, & Scoones, 2012). This frontier is of 
51 
52 course also not entirely new. What is new is the sophisticated legal and    scientific apparatus 
53 
54 that is being deployed to normalise and institutionalise this extension of the scramble    into the 
55 
56 
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1 
2 
3 most microscopic domains of nature, or, as Thompson puts it, the attempt to    ‘patent life’ 
4 
5 (Thompson 2008, p.  318). 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 At the heart of debates about the resource curse then, and attempts to address it, lie persistent 
11 
12 questions about the relationship between extractive TNCs, governments of resource    rich 
13 
14 countries, and the local populations (or stakeholders) who live and work in the    territories of 
15 
16 extractive operations. The failures of governance, representation and legitimacy that   are 
17 
18 
widely held up as both symptoms and underlying causes of the curse have    pushed many 
20 
21 analysts to move away from a focus on the role of the state, to questions of global governance 
22 
23 and transnational ethical regimes, which are seen variously as transcending, bypassing    or 
24 
25 usurping the authority of the state. In the wake of a catalogue of scandals   surrounding 
26 
27 
allegations of the irresponsible exploitation of people and resources through the past century, 
28 
29 
30 those very same companies have emerged today as champions of sustainable    development 
31 
32 through business, in the vanguard of the corporate responsibility movement
2
. Yet   the 
33 
34 portfolio of environmental and social infraction has given way to a decade of initiatives, 
35 
36 codes, agreements and tools aimed at making the industry not only socially responsible,    but 
37 
38 
‘sustainable’, perhaps an oxymoronic promise considering the inherently unsustainable    nature 
40 
41 of extraction (Kirsch,  2009). 
42 
43 
44 
45 As the orthodoxy of sustainable development has gathered momentum over the past    decade, 
46 
47 
it    has recruited support from an extensive and diverse constellation of actors, establishing 
48 
49 
50 TNCs as the potential solution to the resource curse, rather than the cause; as purveyors of 
51 
52 best practice and stewards of good growth, where states,    often described in terms of chronic 
53 
54 incapacity or corrupt rapacity, have failed. Development policy-makers (see for    example, 
55 
56 DFID 2008) and analysts alike have embraced this movement as the dawn of    a new era in 
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1 
2 
3 which not only the great financial resources of corporations, but also the spirit of    enterprise 
4 
5 and competition, are brought    to bear on stemming the tide of the resource curse and 
6 
7 
harnessing the profits of the millennial mineral boom for sustainable development. As Collier 
8 
9 
10 predicts for Africa: 
11 
12 ‘There is now global concern with the perils of misused resource   revenues….civil 
13 
14 society activism, allied with the new sense of corporate responsibility, has led to   the 
15 
16 creation of two new international organisations concerned with the governance   of 
17 
18 
resource revenues: the Kimberley Process and the Extractive Industries   Transparency 
20 
21 Initiative…the new scramble for Africa, between rising Asia and the OECD   countries 
22 
23 carries risks….But it is more likely to be a force for good’. (Collier, 2008, pp.   6-7). 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Yet, while some, such as Collier, portend a more optimistic future where   increasingly 
28 
29 
30 sophisticated tools of good governance and corporate responsibility reverse the    resource 
31 
32 curse to turn mineral wealth into sustainable growth    (Collier, 2008; Hicks, 2015), sceptics 
33 
34 highlight patterns of continuity and the enduring legacy of extraction,    exploitation and 
35 
36 empire-building (Southall & Melber, 2009; Carmody,   2011). 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 While some of the key actors have changed, they argue, mineral investment in much of the 
42 
43 Global South remains characterised by processes of neo-imperialism and    dispossession, 
44 
45 compounded by the effects of hyperliberalisation which have left workers    and citizens even 
46 
47 
more exposed to the ravages of the volatile global market as exemplified in the    devastating 
48 
49 
50 social and ecological effects of half a century of boom and bust on Zambia’s    Copperbelt and 
51 
52 the enduring yet elusive ‘expectation of modernity’ (Ferguson, 1999). The overriding    picture 
53 
54 that emerges, they argue, is that local populations (and particularly the poor) continue to    lose 
55 
56 out and in most cases have been adversely affected by it (Melber,   2009). 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 Meanwhile ethnographers continue to document cases of countries and   communities 
6 
7 
benighted by ‘the curse’, of conflict, dispossession, and of course    resistance and the many 
8 
9 
10 forms it takes (for example, Sawyer, 2004; Zalik, 2004). The promotion of ‘good governance’ 
11 
12 through CSR and accountability measures was certainly a step in the right    direction towards 
13 
14 ‘best practice’. But even with multiple voices and institutional level interventions the    absence 
15 
16 of ‘a cure’ remains palpable. After two decades of debate, action and interaction, never    has it 
17 
18 
been more obvious that major gaps continue    to prevail in our understanding of ‘the curse’. 
20 
21 
22 
23 This, we argue, is where anthropologists have made important strides. Not in    providing the 
24 
25 ‘social detail’ to fill the gaps left empty by the resource curse theory,    but in reconfiguring the 
26 
27 
approach to understanding resource extraction in order to effectively address    it (Weszkalnys, 
28 
29 
30 2011). Indeed, the enduring phrase of Max Gluckman and the   Rhodes-Livingstone 
31 
32 anthropologists – continuity and change – implicitly underwrites or animates much of    the 
33 
34 renewed academic interest and debate surrounding the resource curse and the    social, 
35 
36 ecological and political-economic dynamics of mineral extraction in the new    millennium. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 Thus, Prichard, for example, argues that the new scramble for African minerals    should be 
42 
43 viewed as part of older persistent cycles of capital investment and    mineral extraction in 
44 
45 Africa since early colonial exploration (Prichard, 2009). Likewise Lee, in her study   of 
46 
47 
Europe-Africa trade relations, contends that the apparently progressive shift   towards 
48 
49 
50 reciprocity, equality and a focus on poverty reduction, in fact perpetuates the ties   of 
51 
52 dependency, domination and underdevelopment through ‘a new partition of the    continent 
53 
54 reminiscent of the nineteenth century scramble’ (Lee, 2009, p. 84). The question of South- 
55 
56 South partnership has become a major focus of this often rather polarised debate,   with 
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1 
2 
3 Chinese and Indian investors in energy and minerals either lauded as mutual partners    in the 
4 
5 optimistic promise of South-South development (Taylor,  2006; Collier, 2008; Kopiński   & 
6 
7 
Polus, 2011), or demonised as the new scramblers, driven by a purely mercenary hunt to 
8 
9 
10 satisfy resource needs that are vital to its industrialisation (Naidu, 2009, p. 134; see    also 
11 
12 Alden, 2008). This rather    binary scheme of continuity and disjuncture in the scholarship on 
13 
14 the resource curse has arguably privileged continuity to the neglect of the dynamic    social 
15 
16 forces that both shape and are shaped by these multiple and diverse   encounters. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 Crucially of course, the ‘scramble’ is neither wholly new, nor a replay of the past. It is neither 
22 
23 the dawn of a bold new era of business-led development superseding state    impotence and 
24 
25 failures of the aid industry, nor merely ‘old wine in new bottles’ (Melber, 2009),    as new 
26 
27 
entrants on the extractive landscape reinvigorate century-old forms of imperial    domination, 
28 
29 
30 compradore co-option and ultimately the dispossession of the poorest. At the same    time, the 
31 
32 current orthodoxies of good governance and economic empowerment (the latest   in 
33 
34 progressive development discourse) cannot be seen merely as smokescreens for the    imperial 
35 
36 endeavours and mercenary pursuit of resources. Where ‘change’ enters the analysis, it    tends 
37 
38 
to be at the more abstract level, emphasising that the ‘new scramble’ is the product   of a 
40 
41 neoliberal order, as distinct from the colonial capitalism of the earlier scramble. This   is 
42 
43 certainly a valid starting point, but without greater empirical grounding as to    what this means 
44 
45 in context it becomes difficult to see beyond the headline narrative: the rapacious logic    of 
46 
47 
capital penetrating greenfield territories, extracting resources and compelling consent    across 
48 
49 
50 continents. This makes it hard to get a handle on how, as Satgar puts it, the neoliberal project 
51 
52 is ‘indigenised’ (Satgar, 2009, p. 36), normalised and embedded in local realities   and 
53 
54 everyday practices of resource  extraction. 
55 
56 
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1 
2 
3 The danger here lies in presenting a somewhat agentless picture of economic    investment, 
4 
5 political negotiation and resource extraction, leaving us asking, who are the    powerful actors 
6 
7 
driving and enabling this new scramble? What relationships are being forged? What    novel 
8 
9 
10 forms of elite-pacting, collaboration or co-option are being harnessed to facilitate   these 
11 
12 processes? And what diverse constellation of actors, agendas and interests constitute    resource 
13 
14 ‘partnerships’? 
15 
16 
17 
18 
It is precisely at this disjuncture, we argue, that anthropology enters debates on the    resource 
20 
21 curse, both in its historical legacies and its current trajectories, in confronting head on    the 
22 
23 question of agency. Here,    the ethnographic interest in agency is not only or chiefly concerned 
24 
25 with the agency of subaltern or marginalised actors (as is commonly assumed to be   the 
26 
27 
province of anthropology), but with the elite agencies of the    powerful actors and institutions 
28 
29 
30 driving processes of mineral investment and  extraction. 
31 
32 
33 
34 This is about examining the relationship between resources and development and    how they 
35 
36 are understood and articulated at the local level, it is about questioning the assumptive    basis 
37 
38 
and a unilinear teleology of the resource curse theory (and of ‘development’ more generally). 
40 
41 It    is at once a critique and an exposé where historical knowledge combines with ethnographic 
42 
43 detail to identify and understand ‘the curse’ as a problem manifest on a global scale    – from 
44 
45 the United States (see De Muzio, 2010) to the Persian Gulf (see Gilberthorpe, Clarke,    & 
46 
47 
Sillitoe, 2014) to the tiny state of São Tomé and Príncipe (see Weszkalnys,   2011). 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 In the following sections we consider the contributions made by anthropologists over    the past 
53 
54 decade. These we group into the three interconnected areas we see as key to the contributions 
55 
56 made by anthropologists in studying the resource curse and extractive industry more    broadly. 
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1 
2 
3 In the first section, we consider the issue of agency as a key focus of   ethnographic 
4 
5 engagement with the resource curse.    In particular we review recent shifts in ethnographic 
6 
7 
methodology that enable a more nuanced and multifaceted enquiry into the    constellation of 
8 
9 
10 agencies –  elite as well as subaltern –     at work in sustaining the resource curse discipline. A 
11 
12 new ethnographic focus on the agency of corporate and state actors    within neoliberal 
13 
14 processes of extraction sets out to re-embed our understanding of the resource curse    within 
15 
16 social relations and thereby combat the fetishisation of capital which continues    within much 
17 
18 
of the literature on the resource  curse. 
20 
21 
22 
23 The second section looks in more detail at this work of re-embedding extractive processes in 
24 
25 social relations. Here, we explore how anthropologists have drawn on the    core conceptual 
26 
27 
canon of the discipline – on theories of kinship and hierarchy, reciprocity and exchange not 
28 
29 
30 commonly associated with the extractive industrial complex – to understand the   social 
31 
32 relations that shape and are shaped by resource extraction. This of course seems jarring,    as 
33 
34 extractive industries are so often conceived as purely or primarily technical enterprises,    hard- 
35 
36 edged and divorced from the intricate tissue of kinship ties and moral relations.   The 
37 
38 
anthropology of extraction shows how global flows of resource capital unsettle, entrench or 
40 
41 generate new forms of dependence, patronage and clientelism locally. At the same    time, it 
42 
43 brings to the fore local conceptions of wealth, accumulation, resource and ecology    which 
44 
45 tend to be overlooked in applications of resource curse theory. We see    that far from being 
46 
47 
mere contextual detail, the social and historical specificities challenge the abstract theory    of 
48 
49 
50 the resource curse and the teleological vision of modernisation and development   that 
51 
52 underpins it, demanding better, more refined conceptual tools of analysis that are both    more 
53 
54 nuanced and more progressive in their capacity to incorporate the lifeworlds   and 
55 
56 epistemologies of those affected by  mining. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 This is not just an intellectual project.    It becomes the foundation of what we see to be the 
6 
7 
third and final feature of the anthropology of extraction: politically engaged research –    the 
8 
9 
10 critical branch of anthropological thought that not only challenges the   epistemological 
11 
12 foundations of the resource curse, but critically reconsiders the modes of    intervention it 
13 
14 generates and the extent to which they confront (or eschew) the structural issues at stake.    At 
15 
16 base, what defines the anthropological perspectives on the resource curse, we argue, is    a 
17 
18 
primary focus on relations of power, both at the local and global level.   In this final section 
20 
21 then, we turn to anthropological engagement with the initiatives, policies and    techniques 
22 
23 deployed to address the resource curse. Premised on reductionist models of    global-local that 
24 
25 attempt to provide technical solutions to political problems of entrenched inequalities    and 
26 
27 
struggles over power, they can serve    instead to reproduce the very same conflicts they set out 
28 
29 
30 to address by undermining local and minority struggles for autonomy and   economic 
31 
32 enfranchisement. 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Ethnography and the Question of  Agency 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 Since June Nash’s iconic We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us (1979) and well before, the 
42 
43 discipline of Anthropology has been interested in extractive processes, seeking to    understand 
44 
45 how those who live    or work in the shadow of mines confront the extractive complexes that 
46 
47 
transform their lifeworlds; and how they negotiate or contest the economic, social,    ecological 
48 
49 
50 and not least moral orders in which extractive capitalist developments are embedded (Gordon, 
51 
52 1977; Nash, 1979; Taussig, 1980; Banks & Ballard,   2003). 
53 
54 
55 
56 
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1 
2 
3 Through long-term in-depth ethnographic fieldwork, held up as the cornerstone of    the 
4 
5 discipline, anthropologists have explored subaltern experiences of corporate incursion    and 
6 
7 
mineral extraction, and the ways in which meanings of the resource curse itself are resisted or 
8 
9 
10 re-appropriated, mutating and morphing across geographies as they are embedded in    different 
11 
12 localities.    They have done so initially from those subject to the ravages of the resource curse, 
13 
14 rather than the actors and institutions implicated in its perpetuation, or in the architecture    of 
15 
16 an ethical regime charged with stemming its  tide. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 However the anthropology of extraction has undergone an important shift in    recent years that 
22 
23 we want to reflect on in this paper. While traditional ethnography,    which prioritises long-term 
24 
25 engagement with a particular site, has enabled anthropologists to take the long view of on the 
26 
27 
ground realities to see how lifeworlds and subjectivities are transformed by the coming   of 
28 
29 
30 mines and energy projects (see for example, Sawyer, 2004; Li, 2010; Gardner,   2012; 
31 
32 Hoinathy, 2012; Gilberthorpe, 2013; Golub, 2014; Kirsch, 2014), advances in    multi-sited 
33 
34 ethnography have enabled other anthropologists to track the transnational flows    and corporate 
35 
36 practices of the resource extraction across diverse geographies (see for example,    Welker, 
37 
38 
2009; Rajak, 2011a; Appel, 2015; Gilbert, 2015; Sydow,   2016). 
40 
41 
42 
43 In the past, this methodological commitment to the local and the disciplinary    preoccupation 
44 
45 with the agency of the subaltern (or the lack of it) led to the representation of corporations as 
46 
47 
monolithic vehicles of capital driven by an unstoppable logic of maximisation,    rather than as 
48 
49 
50 the focus of ethnographic interest in themselves. While anthropologists continue to focus    on 
51 
52 local experiences of and engagements with mining and energy ventures (see    for example 
53 
54 Sawyer, 2004; Li, 2010; Gardner, 2012; Gilberthorpe, 2013); others have turned to    the 
55 
56 apparatus and elite agency of extractive companies (and their financiers) themselves    that 
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1 
2 
3 engage with ‘the community’ in processes of extraction in often complex relationships   of 
4 
5 entanglement and disentanglement (Rajak, 2011a; Welker, 2009; Appel, 2012; Kirsch,    2014; 
6 
7 
Gilbert, 2015). This involves exploring the new millennial ‘scramble’ for resources    from the 
8 
9 
10 perspective of the ‘scramblers’ (and how these processes are enabled and/or resisted by    local 
11 
12 political frameworks), as well as investigating the situated social and political    transformations 
13 
14 they are bringing to the lives and strategies of those caught in their wake, however socially, 
15 
16 legally and politically removed they may be from it. In particular,    multi-sited ethnographic 
17 
18 
methodology has shed light on the connections between the localised experience   and 
20 
21 understandings of the resource curse among those at the ‘coalface’ of extraction and the    elite 
22 
23 processes of strategy, policy-making and capital investment in the ‘boardrooms’ of    extractive 
24 
25 enterprises. Crucially, we stress, that while ethnographers have traditionally focused on    the 
26 
27 
agency (or lack thereof) of    the ‘powerless’, and on the ways local populations affected by and 
28 
29 
30 implicated in resource extraction nevertheless find modes of resistance,   one of the   most 
31 
32 significant contributions of anthropology to debates about the resource curse has   been 
33 
34 bringing into focus the agency of the  powerful. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Weszkalnys (2010) highlights the performative power of resource economics, and the    ways 
40 
41 in which international experts and economists deploy theories of the resource curse to explain 
42 
43 why countries fail to enjoy the boons of mineral wealth. Crucially,    she argues, 
44 
45 anthropologists should analyse how these theories shape (rather than reflect) the real world of 
46 
47 
mineral extraction. But we can go further than this.    The field of resource economics (just like 
48 
49 
50 economic theory more broadly) is intimately connected to corporate strategy and    corporate 
51 
52 interests, two mutually sustaining arenas of knowledge and practice,   symbolically 
53 
54 encapsulated in the BP Chair and Centre for the Analysis of Resource-Rich Economies    at 
55 
56 Oxford University, set up with a $14 million endowment from BP. In ‘studying   up’, 
  
39 
 
 
1 
2 
3 anthropologists have turned the ethnographic lens on (or up) to the corridors of power, to 
4 
5 disentangle the agency of various actors within elite coalitions that have served to endow 
6 
7 
TNCs with moral authority and the responsibility to ensure good governance and the    honest 
8 
9 
10 payment of revenues. The contribution of anthropology to problematising the ‘resource    curse’ 
11 
12 lies as much in illuminating the powerful agency within the forces of extraction, and   the 
13 
14 instruments, apparatus and partnerships which sustain corporate power, as it does with    the 
15 
16 experience of those who become subject to  them. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 Meanwhile, another recent field of enquiry further pushes the boundaries of the analysis    of 
22 
23 agency in the politics of resource exploitation, by locating the agency    (or ‘potentialities’ as it 
24 
25 is dubbed) of resources themselves, and examining how the specificities of the resource itself 
26 
27 
(that is, its material agency) provides a source of power (Richardson & Weszkalnys,    2014). 
28 
29 
30 According to this approach, which takes its lead from actor-network theory, it is the qualities 
31 
32 of oil itself, for example (both its intrinsic material properties and its cultural constructions    in 
33 
34 local and in global commodity flows), that endow it with a power to convene   actors, 
35 
36 knowledge, technologies and of course capital, to create particular configurations   (or 
37 
38 
assemblages) of people and things in diverse localities, which in turn give rise to    particular 
40 
41 patterns, flows and expectations (Weszkalnys, 2014). Equally,    for miners in Jessica Smith 
42 
43 Rolston’s study of Wyoming’s Powder River Basin, it is the unpredictable seams of    the 
44 
45 crumbling coalface itself that has an awe-inspiring and menacing agency that seems to    outwit 
46 
47 
or outplay managerial codes of health and safety, laying bare    the hubris of human ambitions 
48 
49 
50 to tame the coalface. Corporate codes of responsibility which (cl)aim to make    environments 
51 
52 safer become instead instruments to discipline the workforce, while the coalface    remains 
53 
54 untameable (Rolston,  2014). 
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1 
2 
3 This interest in the materiality of resources is connected to a concern for the spatiality   of 
4 
5 extraction – and the kinds of social relations and economic flows it generates and impedes – 
6 
7 
directing attention to the particular historical evolutions and divergences across sectors   in 
8 
9 
10 modes of extractions (Ferguson, 2005; Appel, 2012; Behrends, Reyna & Schlee,    2013). 
11 
12 James Ferguson, for example, contrasts the mineral and oil enclaves that he   argues 
13 
14 characterise neoliberal modes of extraction across Sub-Saharan Africa today with the    all- 
15 
16 encompassing social projects of a former paternalistic era of mining on the continent    that 
17 
18 
oversaw the construction of whole company towns and the colonisation of all social   life 
20 
21 (Ferguson, 2005). In this neoliberal order of resource enclaving, mining, he contends,    has 
22 
23 come increasingly to resemble offshore oil production, physically isolated and contained    by 
24 
25 technical security apparatus, and socially and economically divorced from the national    grid 
26 
27 
(Ferguson,    2005). Yet in doing so, he himself replicates the very tendency to expunge from 
28 
29 
30 view the mobility of people and the intricate web of social relations and material transactions 
31 
32 that transgress these boundaries, revealing their very permeability despite state-of-the    art 
33 
34 security systems, as Appel’s work shows (Appel, 2012,   2015). 
35 
36 
37 
38 
In these accounts, the state is defined as much by its absence    as its presence, appearing as 
40 
41 thin or even ‘hollowed out’ (Ferguson, 2006; Bridge, 2010). Meanwhile neoliberal    processes 
42 
43 of production and extraction are represented, as Duffy puts it, as being all ‘about    dispersing 
44 
45 power away from geographically defined nation states’ (Duffy, 2006, p. 93).  Here    then, 
46 
47 
while Ferguson echoes an assumption underpinning much of the critical scholarship    on the 
48 
49 
50 resource curse – that extractive companies, particularly within the energy sector,    increasingly 
51 
52 bypass the state through local enclaving (Ferguson, 2005) or partnership with    non-state actors 
53 
54 (Gardner, 2012) – Appel confronts it (Appel, 2012). Thus Appel examines the    complex web 
55 
56 of partnerships, separations and mobilities that have  emerged around Equatorial   Guinea’s 
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1 
2 
3 offshore oil industry. Appel argues that new power arrangements are mobilised   through 
4 
5 opposing and distinctive types of infrastructure (corporate and local) that foster and    sustain 
6 
7 
the appearance of separation. This ‘infrastructural violence’, she argues, reinforces   racial 
8 
9 
10 hierarchies and inequities on the one    hand and the power of extractive companies (‘old guard’ 
11 
12 paternalism) on the other. This political act of abstraction, she argues, has allowed   the 
13 
14 company to dissociate themselves from the resource curse by positioning themselves as    the 
15 
16 benevolent agent, and placing its cause and effect firmly in the hands of the State    (Appel, 
17 
18 
2012, 2015). 
20 
21 
22 
23 This recent turn in the anthropology of natural resources and political ecology has sought to 
24 
25 bring TNCs and the state back into the picture. This work explores how the state enters, 
26 
27 
facilitates, mediates or brokers the exploitation of natural resources.    This is a dialectical 
28 
29 
30 process, demanding that we ask not only how TNCs negotiate the state, but how the state, in 
31 
32 turn, shapes the corporate form, not only in its formal role as regulator   or majority 
33 
34 shareholder, but in the more intangible, yet nevertheless important, dimension of    shaping 
35 
36 corporate identity and cultures of social responsibility, which may invoke national    rootedness 
37 
38 
alongside their assertion of global corporate citizenship (see also Welker’s study of   an 
40 
41 American company in Indonesia (2014), and Rajak’s (2014) discussion of the    ‘proudly South 
42 
43 African’ claims of Anglo  American). 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Extractive TNCs emerge from this empirical body of work as    simultaneously rooted in the 
48 
49 
50 local sites of their    operations and home countries, yet at the same time defined by networks 
51 
52 of connection, personnel and processes that are distributed across a transnational   scale. 
53 
54 
  
19 
39 
 
 
1 
2 
3 This directs our attention to the kinds of social, moral and cultural practices employed    by 
4 
5 extractive companies in pursuit of legitimacy, authenticity and, ultimately, the consent    or 
6 
7 
acquiescence of local communities to their presence.  In this vein, Rogers has shown how    oil 
8 
9 
10 production in the Perm region of post-Soviet Russia is enmeshed in the production of    cultural 
11 
12 capital, sealing the material and moral bond between the industrial and the cultural life of the 
13 
14 community in the corporate quest for authenticity by the country’s oil and gas    giants (Rogers, 
15 
16 2012, p. 285). In South Africa, as in Perm, the (pre)history of mineral deposits comes to stand 
17 
18 
for the deep historical presence (and dominance) of the mining industry,    naturalising the bond 
20 
21 between mining and the nation, and the country’s extractive giants and society (Rajak,    2014). 
22 
23 
24 
25 The resources (whether social, cultural, political or moral) and agencies that corporate    actors 
26 
27 
draw on to achieve their goals are equally embedded and diffused rather than    centralised in 
28 
29 
30 say the London headquarters of a mining company. Thus, Welker (2009) draws our attention 
31 
32 to local brokerage (and corporatisation) as a vital means through    which extractive companies 
33 
34 secure access to resources. What emerges    potently from this kind of ethnographic approach 
35 
36 that sets out to break down the crude scales of multinational versus village    community is, 
37 
38 
once again, the centrality of actors. And more specifically still, the agency of    local actors in 
40 
41 facilitating, and brokering the processes of capital investment and the kinds of   corporate 
42 
43 power they convey.    This kind of agency and the forms of governmentality it enables is 
44 
45 similarly a key ethnographic target of Michael Watts’ work in the Niger Delta3,    which reveals 
46 
47 
the precarious agency of local and national elites whose conflicting yet interwoven    interests 
48 
49 
50 and struggles over the material and immaterial gains that flow from oil sustain the resource 
51 
52 curse as an economy in itself (Watts, 2008). In doing so, it confounds any crude dichotomy of 
53 
54 ‘good versus evil’ that can underscore much of the polarised and polemic discourse    on the 
55 
56 resource curse pitting the interests of ‘communities’ against ‘capital’ (Knudsen, 2014, p.    85). 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 This attention to the elite agencies at work in reproducing and sustaining the    resource curse, 
4 
5 raises a key empirical question: to what extent are these dominant corporate    configurations 
6 
7 
negotiated, contested, reshaped and rescripted by local forces in practice; how    does the 
8 
9 
10 exercise of local agency act upon and reshape the extractive corporations and   states 
11 
12 themselves? 
13 
14 
15 
16 Teleologies of Extraction: Re-embedding Extraction in Social   Relations 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 Processes of extraction are commonly seen to be defined by geological   determinants, 
22 
23 technological constituents and the economic imperatives of productivity and profit. As    a 
24 
25 result, the process of resource extraction is often mirrored by an analytical abstraction    by 
26 
27 
which models of resource economics are abstracted from the    social politics and power 
28 
29 
30 relations which drive them. This analytical abstraction not only mirrors the   physical 
31 
32 extraction of resources from their social environments, but reflects the spatial   enclaving 
33 
34 which increasingly defines extractive operations, particularly in Sub-Saharan   Africa 
35 
36 (Ferguson, 2005; Appel, 2012,  2015). 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 By placing the social relations of extraction front and centre, anthropological    approaches set 
42 
43 out to counterbalance the depersonalisation that has dominated accounts of the    political 
44 
45 economy of resource extraction. At the same time, we suggest, it is driven by an implicit (and 
46 
47 
at times explicit) political intention to counter a myopic industry gaze which divorces    the 
48 
49 
50 modes of production from    the delicate tissue of social relations. The myriad social bonds, 
51 
52 dependencies and forces which corporate discourse relegates to the categories   of 
53 
54 ‘externalities’ can be seen as potent expressions of what Comaroff and Comaroff describe as 
55 
56 a broader imperative within neoliberal capitalism for abstraction, in this severing of    the 
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1 
2 
3 workforce, recast as ‘human capital’ ‘from its human context’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000, 
4 
5 p. 305). 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 The anthropology of extraction approaches this project of re-embedding    by bringing its own 
11 
12 conceptual toolkit or apparatus to bear on exploring the evolving dynamics of   extractive 
13 
14 processes as embedded social processes of continuity and change. This involves,   applying 
15 
16 anthropological tropes such as kinship, gift and reciprocity as heuristic devices to    analyse 
17 
18 
how resource extraction generates and reshapes social relations between corporate    actors, 
20 
21 state officials, and their wider ‘stakeholders’ (to borrow from corporate jargon), and    to 
22 
23 investigate how the economies of extraction create new domains for the exercise of    power, 
24 
25 and new struggles over authority, at the micro-level as much as the   macro. 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 The anthropology of oil is a potent example of this. Commonly viewed as a world apart from 
31 
32 affective relations, the oil industry is generally seen as determined by the demands   of 
33 
34 industrialisation and an asocial logic of accumulation – that it is capital, not   kinship, 
35 
36 shareholder value not sentiment that holds sway (Sawyer, 2005; Gledhill, 2013).    Where 
37 
38 
social relations enter the picture, they do so as externalities which pose risks    to production 
40 
41 that must be managed. But recent ethnographic work has revealed how    oil production is 
42 
43 intimately bound up with (and in fact dependent on) various forms of moral economy.    Thus 
44 
45 in    the oil fields of Argentina, for example, Shever shows us kinship sodalities at work in and 
46 
47 
intrinsic to the process of oil privatisation. Shever is concerned with the generative power of 
48 
49 
50 affect, how it shapes and produces business and the economy, transgressing    prescribed 
51 
52 boundaries between ‘affective desires and economic goals’ (Shever, 2012, p. 19).    Similarly, 
53 
54 Gilberthorpe shows how the technologies of CSR in the oil operations of Papua New Guinea 
55 
56 serve    to ‘objectify social relations, abstracting them from the rules of kinship… and exchange 
  
19 
39 
 
 
1 
2 
3 that ensure social and economic security’ (Gilberthorpe, 2013). In all cases, kinship,    or kin- 
4 
5 like relations are shown to be a resource that is exploited in the process of natural resource 
6 
7 
development and extraction, yet leaves the targets of corporate policies   weaker. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 The abstraction of resource economies from social relations has the broader unintended    effect 
13 
14 of creating a kind of exceptionalism, which marks out resource abundant states as exceptional 
15 
16 and defined in essence by their mineral wealth. Political structures, economic relations,    and 
17 
18 
environmental landscape are all seen to be predetermined and explained by a    geological 
20 
21 destiny. This dark destiny – or doomed teleology of negative progress    – as scripted in the 
22 
23 development discourse of the resource curse feeds into a common narrative of expectations    of 
24 
25 modernity, to borrow Ferguson’s phrase, turned to decades of    betrayal and disappointment 
26 
27 
(Ferguson, 1999). 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 Grounded ethnographic work has begun to reveal the productive, discursive capacity of    the 
33 
34 resource curse to reshape local economies, social relations and politics to its    own theory, 
35 
36 driving expectations in its wake. In this way anthropologists    have explored how both resource 
37 
38 
investments, and the partnership agreements and development deals in which they are framed, 
40 
41 produce dominant discourses of progress, growth and economic sovereignty which    are 
42 
43 internalised as popular imaginaries and aspirations of opportunity, mobility,    economic 
44 
45 empowerment and connection (Ferguson, 1999; Sillitoe & Wilson, 2001; Rajak,    2011a; 
46 
47 
Gardner, 2012; Weszkalnys, 2014; Sydow,    2016). Whether expectations of a job, a chance to 
48 
49 
50 grab a piece of the local economy expanding on the back of prospective    mineral operations, 
51 
52 to win a tender in the supply chain, or the hope of patronage, and the trickle down of benefits 
53 
54 from corporate social investment, or the even more vague, yet no less alluring hope   of 
55 
56 
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1 
2 
3 entrepreneurial opportunity, for many these aspirations will remain tantalisingly out of    reach 
4 
5 (Rajak, 2011a; Weszkalnys,  2014). 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 The foreclosure of such hope emerges as a potent theme across diverse ethnographic    studies 
11 
12 chronicling how dreams of broad-based development give  way to exclusionary   benefits, 
13 
14 aspirations of inclusion are met with enhanced inequalities and even dispossession   of 
15 
16 opportunity (Dolan & Rajak, 2016), and connection becomes disconnection (Appel,    2012; 
17 
18 
Gardner, 2012). This is particularly the case in contexts of resource extraction where    resource 
20 
21 investments (extant and extinct), once pitted as ‘development’ in exchange for    inevitable 
22 
23 ecological devastation, social fragmentation and geographical displacement, have left a    trail 
24 
25 of resentment and subsequent hostility and conflict. Resentment within communities    whose 
26 
27 
hopes and expectations have been dashed is as palpable in Sawyer’s Crude    Chronicles from 
28 
29 
30 Ecuador (2004), as it is in Kirsch’s account of Mining Capitalism from Papua    New Guinea 
31 
32 (2014), Langton and Mazel’s ethnography of mining in Australia (2008), and Watts’ study of 
33 
34 the Niger Delta (2001,  2008). 
35 
36 
37 
38 
A key question then for the ethnography of extraction is how resource abundance and its flip 
40 
41 side, the resource curse, are conceptualised by people who are subject to the prospective or 
42 
43 ongoing processes of extraction (see for example Kirsch, 2006; Gilberthorpe & Banks,    2012). 
44 
45 The resource curse paradigm itself represents a new ‘discourse of development’ that,    like 
46 
47 
discourses (or paradigms) of progress before it conveys particular normative values, imposing 
48 
49 
50 particular conceptions of success and failure. As models travel, they are   themselves 
51 
52 productive of social relations – and the resource curse, conveyed through the   global 
53 
54 instruments of good governance, as much as the extractive processes they are intended    to 
55 
56 govern, do precisely this (Weszkalnys, 2010; Behrends & Hoinathy, 2014). Good    governance 
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1 
2 
3 as the magic bullet to the resource curse has, as Sanders and West write of ‘transparency’ (a 
4 
5 related concept), ‘become endowed with symbolic power’ as it ‘travel(s) the globe    conveying 
6 
7 
notions fundamental to the operative logic of globalizing economic and    political institutions’ 
8 
9 
10 (Sanders & West, 2003, p. 10). Tracking the discursive    practices and normative values that 
11 
12 attend the flows of mineral resources and capital, from multiple positions across   the 
13 
14 geographical and social places in which TNCs operate    – as well as at different points in a 
15 
16 vertical hierarchy – illuminates the pervasive and productive power of the    ‘resource curse’ as 
17 
18 
a set of knowledge practices in itself to shape local realities and reinvent the authority of 
20 
21 global corporate power through ethical  regimes. 
22 
23 
24 
25 Taken together, this body of work collectively highlights how development orthodoxies    are 
26 
27 
themselves productive of popular expectations. The twin paradigms of good-growth    and 
28 
29 
30 resource curse are no exception to this – as they are    internalised, animating individual 
31 
32 aspirations and, in turn, haunting the sense of failed or deferred expectations that mirror    the 
33 
34 broader failures of the developmental state to translate mineral wealth into good growth    and 
35 
36 economic sovereignty. Watts’ work on the Niger Delta is particularly poignant here    (Watts, 
37 
38 
2001, 2008). Watts has examined in detail the plight of the Ogoni who have lived and toiled 
40 
41 amidst the pipelines that transport the products (and profits) of extraction away from their 
42 
43 locale, bringing immense gains for Royal Dutch Shell,    significant resource rents to the 
44 
45 Nigerian State, and scant returns to the Ogoni for the dispossession of land and    livelihoods. 
46 
47 
This of course remains the commonplace outcome for many indigenous groups in    their 
48 
49 
50 confrontations with extractive investments across the world. As does the    alienation that 
51 
52 comes from the manifest disjuncture between embedded local cosmologies   and 
53 
54 epistemologies of resources and their wider ecology, and externally imposed    neoliberal 
55 
56 ideologies of extraction, land and nature. A key challenge then becomes the imperative    for 
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1 
2 
3 indigenous minorities and local groups to articulate and translate their cultural norms,    values 
4 
5 and philosophies of the environment in ways that are    deemed to ‘fit’ dominant neoliberal 
6 
7 
narratives of resource use, development and progress/modernity (see Trigger,   1987). 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 This epistemological dissonance, and the attendant challenge of translation, emerges    similarly 
13 
14 as a theme in Golub’s ethnography of gold mining in Papua New Guinea (2014),    however 
15 
16 with quite contrasting outcomes. Chronicling Ipili narratives of resource development    around 
17 
18 
the Porgera mine, Golub shows  us: 
20 
21 ‘Just as the gold in a mountain requires refining if    it is to take a form suitable for 
22 
23 circulation in national and international financial markets, so too the identities of   the 
24 
25 Ipili people had to be refined and transformed in order    to circulate in the national and 
26 
27 
international arenas of law, policy, and ideas that accompany and   buttress 
28 
29 
30 transnational capitalism’ (Golub, 2014, p.  19). 
31 
32 
33 
34 While industrial extraction has been far from smooth for the Ipili (see also Filer, 1999; 
35 
36 Biersack, 2006) a combination of factors, including Papua New Guinea’s more    recent 
37 
38 
colonial history, their political links with Australia, and the state’s recognition of    indigenous 
40 
41 landowners, means that their relationship    with mineral wealth sits in stark contrast to that of 
42 
43 the Ogoni. 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Collectively, these works emphasise how resource environments are both historically    defined 
48 
49 
50 and externally configured. The crucial point to be made here is that the process of   re- 
51 
52 embedding analyses of    the resource curse in the social relations and politics of extraction, 
53 
54 serves equally to re-embed them in particular histories and colonial legacies.    This enables us 
55 
56 to make sense of specific social struggles and political economic trajectories that   shape 
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1 
2 
3 current patterns of resource extraction. Centuries of land use, access and   territorial 
4 
5 demarcation as well as local and regional structures of hierarchy and power are the result of a 
6 
7 
multitude of factors at the local, regional, national (such as colonialism, slavery)    and global 
8 
9 
10 (globalisation, liberalisation) level. As these ethnographic studies show us,   extractive 
11 
12 industries are inserted into existing structures of power and interaction that ultimately    breed 
13 
14 different outcomes. As Watts argues, Nigeria’s history of early colonial violence    shaped the 
15 
16 interethnic relations that are now habitually reinforced by the state. And yet the    peculiarities 
17 
18 
of history are not part of the resource curse theory. The assumption of a single    resource 
20 
21 development paradigm to which the theory can be applied is perhaps the    biggest flaw in the 
22 
23 theory that ethnographic research continues to challenge. The ethnographic engagement    with 
24 
25 resource extraction, as Golub’s Leviathans at the Gold Mine demonstrates, highlights    the 
26 
27 
necessity of historicising the resource curse and its effects if we want to even begin    to 
28 
29 
30 consider its future  trajectories. 
31 
32 
33 
34 Based on this reconfiguration, anthropologists stress that the resource curse is not   a 
35 
36 peculiarity of low or even middle income countries, highlighting the presence of the    various 
37 
38 
characteristics taken to be symptoms of the resource curse in    high-income countries such as 
40 
41 Australia, the US, Canada, Scotland, Norway, Finland, Russia, and the Gulf (see    for example, 
42 
43 Lawrence, 2007; Langton & Mazel, 2008; Coumans, 2011; Brotherstone,    2012; Cumbers, 
44 
45 2012; McNeish & Logan, 2012; Overland & Kutschera, 2012; Rogers, 2012;    Gilberthorpe et 
46 
47 
al., 2014; Rolston, 2014; Szeman,    2014). What these studies underline is that ‘the curse’ is 
48 
49 
50 not solely driven by economics. Rather, they argue, it should    be understood as a confluence 
51 
52 of social and political-economic processes including: the commodification of land,    economic 
53 
54 and social dependence on a non-renewable and environmentally-damaging energy    source, 
55 
56 persistent social and geographical inequities in infrastructure and development   benefits 
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1 
2 
3 financed by the nation’s mineral wealth, and health and safety concerns around new forms    of 
4 
5 mineral and energy extraction to which recent debates and protests around fracking   in 
6 
7 
particular have brought renewed attention (Szeman, 2013; Willow & Wylie,   2014). 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 Here, ethnographic accounts contest the dominant geographies that underpin    conventional 
13 
14 assumptions about the resource curse – and the North-South binary according to    which they 
15 
16 continue to be ordered. In so doing, they aim equally to destabilise    the association of liberal 
17 
18 
governance, good growth and the positive exploitation    of resources on the one side, and weak 
20 
21 governance, wasted opportunity and the mismanagement of resource wealth on the other.    For 
22 
23 it is not only the dominant spatial configurations which commonly inform discussions of    the 
24 
25 resource curse that anthropological approaches question, but the teleological narratives    of 
26 
27 
investment, extraction and progress that underwrite development paradigms of    resource 
28 
29 
30 governance. This is exemplified in Stammler’s study of reindeer pastoralists in    northwest 
31 
32 Siberia where they have, he recounts, coexisted peacefully with extractive industries    despite 
33 
34 the steady encroachment of oil and gas extraction over the past 40 years (Stammler, 2013). 
35 
36 Here, persistent socialist values (including superiority of state over individual interests) and    a 
37 
38 
powerfully unifying Russian post-Soviet identity (inculcated in part by state   ideology) 
40 
41 provide both security and an inoculation or insulation from the kinds    of conflict and struggles 
42 
43 over resources that are commonly held up to typify the resource curse.    Thus Stammler shows 
44 
45 us how, counter to the discourse of    liberal governance (as the prerequisite for preventing or 
46 
47 
mitigating the perils of the resource curse), it is in fact the legacy of    Soviet control and 
48 
49 
50 planning that has kept the curse at bay in northwest Siberia. What might appear as   an 
51 
52 anachronistic or even nostalgic persistence of Soviet values and ideology shaping the    politics 
53 
54 of extraction in Siberia offers a counter narrative that unsettles the dominant teleologies    of 
55 
56 modernisation, liberalisation and growth that underpin conventional resource curse    theory. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 At the same time, Stammler makes clear that ‘peaceful coexistence’ (Stammler, 2013, p.    261) 
6 
7 
does not translate to national or cultural homogeneity on the one hand, or   individual 
8 
9 
10 wellbeing on the other. Land grabbing for extractive infrastructure may be unchallenged,    but 
11 
12 it provokes a type of internal, personal conflict rather than an externalised one that   is 
13 
14 conducive to the phenomenon of a ‘resource curse’ (Stammler, 2013, p. 243).    Stammler’s 
15 
16 case study represents a factionalism that decries any homogeneity of interests that is as much 
17 
18 
a condition of the resource curse phenomenon in northwest Siberia as it is in the Niger Delta. 
20 
21 State ideology and state politics thus emerge as intrinsic to local level action, an outcome also 
22 
23 seen as an effect of neoliberalism in Latin America (see for example, Gledhill, 2013).    The 
24 
25 widespread indigenous notion of ‘good living’ across South America (for    example, sumak 
26 
27 
kawsay for the Quechua of Ecuador) is one example of how state politics fosters   the 
28 
29 
30 nationalisation and politicisation of culture (see for example, Warnaars & Bebbington,    2014). 
31 
32 
33 
34 Narratives of failed ‘resource developments’ are of course not confined to the   so-called 
35 
36 ‘Global South’. As Di Muzio argues (2010) the resource curse is as much a US as a Nigerian 
37 
38 
phenomenon. We argue that the effects of ‘the curse’ (the collateral damage) are   more 
40 
41 conspicuous in contexts with an indigenous minority where uneven development is    strikingly 
42 
43 manifest. Langton and Mazel (2008) demonstrate this in Australia’s Pilbara, a region    that has 
44 
45 been exploited for its minerals for over 70 years. In their case study of the Pilbara,    Langton 
46 
47 
and Mazel argue that improved CSR and the introduction of Native    Title Agreements in the 
48 
49 
50 1990s has done little to improve living standards in indigenous regions, and has contributed 
51 
52 little to providing better participation and decision making amongst Aboriginal    communities 
53 
54 (see also Martin, Trigger, & Parmenter, 2014). Despite this, constrained by the    entrenched 
55 
56 geographic prescriptions common to resource curse theory, Langton and Mazel state    that the 
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1 
2 
3 Australian case study is not an example of the (economically defined) ‘resource curse’ theory. 
4 
5 Instead, Australia, like Canada, Botswana, and Norway,    is described as a ‘growth winner’ 
6 
7 
(Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006) and thus not a victim of ‘the curse’. Like many high and 
8 
9 
10 middle income countries, Australia is defeated by the narrow limitations of the resource curse 
11 
12 theory. ‘Collateral damage’ (Watts, 2013, p. 54) here is tangible.    Indeed, Langton and 
13 
14 Mazel’s empirical account in itself contests the categories of ‘growth winners’ (and    by 
15 
16 extension ‘losers’), and the crude geographies that tend to underpin them, demanding   a 
17 
18 
deeper reconfiguration of the theory itself in order to better understand the full scope of    its 
20 
21 effects. 
22 
23 
24 
25 This brings to the fore broader questions surrounding the capitalisation of    land and resources 
26 
27 
inherent in notions of the resource curse, and the perceived failure of states to make good on 
28 
29 
30 the potential    of their national patrimony by maximising the return on their natural endowment. 
31 
32 As a symbol and driver of economic development premised on a classic teleology   of 
33 
34 modernisation and progress, extractive industry thus inherits and consumes the concept    of 
35 
36 terra nullius, whereby the value of land is identified in terms of its productive    capacity, while 
37 
38 
precolonial, indigenous or alternative stewardship of the land is ignored (Trigger,    1997; 
40 
41 Kirsch, 2014). This involves a normative valuation of land and its usage that    is deemed 
42 
43 ‘underproductive’ (according to the World Bank’s own index, for example) juxtaposed with 
44 
45 the vast complexes of natural resource exploitation held up as ‘panoramas of   technical 
46 
47 
achievement’ (Trigger, 1997, p. 165). Here the powerful teleology of progress and    global 
48 
49 
50 integration is held up as the antithesis to the resource curse to validate or provide    moral 
51 
52 authentication to the project of development through industrial expansion. In challenging    this 
53 
54 teleology, ethnography can be seen as a political project, attempting to bring to   light 
55 
56 alternative panoramas of development, emic visions of economic self-determination    or 
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1 
2 
3 indigenous ecologies which may reject the very commodification of nature as a    ‘resource’ in 
4 
5 the first place. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 For this reason, Kirsch eschews the concept of ‘the resource curse’ altogether,    burdened as it 
11 
12 is with normative values that may not correspond with those who live in areas affected by 
13 
14 extractive industries. He speaks instead of ‘colliding ecologies’ bringing sharply into    focus 
15 
16 the clash between indigenous conceptions of and relationships to nature and the social    and 
17 
18 
environmental effects of large-scale extractive projects (Kirsch, 2014, p. 15).   This 
20 
21 ethnographic approach refocuses analysis on the micro-economic and social costs   of 
22 
23 extraction, that are disproportionately shouldered by those living in the vicinity of    operations, 
24 
25 but which are not amenable to the macro-economic measurements of resource    economists 
26 
27 
and are therefore rarely included in discussions of the resource curse: the   incalculable 
28 
29 
30 experience of loss, dispossession, destruction of the fragile tissue of human    relations, 
31 
32 alienation from one’s landscape and ‘impoverishment by pollution’. Kirsch captures    this 
33 
34 dystopian industrial reality viscerally, implicitly asking the question – can this really be    the 
35 
36 acceptable cost of  extraction? 
37 
38 
‘The    new landscape downstream from the Ok Tedi mine is alien to the people living 
40 
41 there. Rivers that once ran green and clear have been transformed into    muddy 
42 
43 torrents the color of coffee with milk.    Three decades of mining have transformed the 
44 
45 verdant landscape along the river corridor into a moonscape of gray tailings’   (Kirsch, 
46 
47 
2014, p. 16). 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 From Kirsch’s long term ethnographic engagement with those living in the shadow of the Ok 
53 
54 Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea, to Sawyer’s study of oil exploitation in Ecuador,   the 
55 
56 capacity of the resource curse as a dominant development paradigm to marginalise    or even 
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1 
2 
3 silence alternative ecologies, conflicting ontologies of the environment and nature, not    to 
4 
5 mention wealth and the shibboleth of progress, emerges powerfully as a common    thread 
6 
7 
linking ethnographies of extraction across diverse geographies. As an intellectual    project, 
8 
9 
10 which is driven by a political (and arguably ethical) commitment to subaltern    representation, 
11 
12 ethnography applies emic categories in order to challenge or reconfigure the    epistemological 
13 
14 foundations of the resource  curse. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Putting social relations at the forefront of both approaches to and analyses of    the resource 
20 
21 curse is then both an intellectual and political enterprise. Watts’ politically   engaged 
22 
23 ethnography of petroviolence in the Niger Delta makes this point clearly. He    confronts the 
24 
25 extent of fatalities suffered by the Ogoni, perhaps the most wretched effect of the    resource 
26 
27 
curse, chalked up in the industry as the cost of doing business in areas of ‘weak governance’ 
28 
29 
30 and instability or, as he puts it: ‘the collateral damage associated with producing    and moving 
31 
32 vast quantities of oil’ (Watts, 2013, p. 54). This effect, indisputable in the oil sector, but also 
33 
34 tangible across the wider extractives sector, is difficult to quantify. As such it    rarely forms 
35 
36 part of the discourse on resource developments. Ethnographic research, as Watts’    work 
37 
38 
forcefully attests, brings the collateral damage into sharp focus to illustrate the    very real, 
40 
41 human impacts of ‘the curse’, and as such is a political project as well as an intellectual one, 
42 
43 contesting the corporate discourse of risk management to place these    so-called ‘externalities’ 
44 
45 front and centre in the debate about the legitimacy (and morality) of operating in contexts    of 
46 
47 
ongoing and violent conflict,    rather than the products of extraction and the apparent revenues 
48 
49 
50 they yield. 
51 
52 
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1 
2 
3 The Politics of Engagement: Technical Solutions to Political   Problems 
4 
5 
6 
7 
As Paul Collier notes, ‘there is now global concern with the perils of misused   resource 
8 
9 
10 revenues’ (Collier, 2008, p. 6). The outcome has been a raft of voluntary agreements and 
11 
12 instruments which constituted the rapidly emerging ethical regime targeting the effects of    the 
13 
14 resource curse at the global level, which national governments had failed to regulate.    A 
15 
16 movement which, led by NGOs, began with the    aim of exposing and demanding an end to 
17 
18 
mismanagement and corruption in resource exploitation, has shifted to a focus on   the 
20 
21 corruption and mismanagement of resources and revenues by Southern governments at    the 
22 
23 expense of their people, over whom this coalition of corporations, NGOs and development 
24 
25 bilateral extends their collective guardianship formally authenticated through   multi- 
26 
27 
stakeholder partnerships, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative aimed    at 
28 
29 
30 ensuring accountability in the payment and expenditure of revenues from   resource 
31 
32 exploitation. Such global instruments of government which claim a capacity   for 
33 
34 decontextualisation, abstraction and recontextualisation in diverse local realities, hold out    the 
35 
36 persuasive promise of a collective societal responsibility governed by voluntary   global 
37 
38 
regimes of accountability. They extend the compelling vision of disparate parties   with 
40 
41 formerly divergent interests – corporations, NGOs, even trade unions – brought    together in a 
42 
43 collaborative venture for the collective goal of sustainable development. The   novel 
44 
45 partnerships that have emerged in this era of CSR and global governance do indeed, at times, 
46 
47 
appear to have achieved a shift from combat to collaboration (Rajak,   2011b). 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 At the same time, in an effort to address the developmental failures of    national partnerships 
53 
54 from whom they obtain the legal licence to operate, to deliver the consent of    the people, 
55 
56 extractive industries (and their representative bodies such as the ICMM) have    looked both to 
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1 
2 
3 the global arena and local level in pursuit of other sources of legitimacy. The failures of 
4 
5 accountability, and even more fundamentally legitimacy that are seen to be at the    root of the 
6 
7 
resource curse, have led to the elusive quest for the ‘social licence to operate’. This is 
8 
9 
10 encapsulated in the statement of the former CEO of Shell and Chairman of Anglo    American: 
11 
12 ‘Any major company will seek to command the consent of the people who live in   the 
13 
14 vicinity of a new mine since the price to pay reputationally and through delays   and 
15 
16 disruption, for riding rough shod over local opinion is a high one’   (Moody-Stuart, 
17 
18 
2006, p. 24) 
20 
21 
22 
23 The social licence thus emerges as an essential component not simply to the ethics   of 
24 
25 extractive operations but to their very survival. As Welker puts it ‘corporate security begins 
26 
27 
in the community’ (Welker, 2009, p. 142). ‘This isn’t a grand    philanthropic gesture’, the 
28 
29 
30 former chairman of Rio Tinto and Barrack Gold commented, ‘I don’t see it as   my 
31 
32 responsibility to spend shareholder money on grand philanthropic gestures, it’s actually    how 
33 
34 we build security for long-term business investment. It makes the company a    much more 
35 
36 attractive partner to a host    government or host community’
4
. The quest for the social or moral 
37 
38 
licence as it is sometimes dubbed, is concretely materialised in tick-box models such as    the 
40 
41 ICMM’s ‘Community Development Toolkit’ or Anglo American’s SEAT which aim    to take 
42 
43 all stakeholders (or their representatives recognised by the company) into account    while 
44 
45 maintaining a replicable model of resource-based development. As such, they require    that 
46 
47 
heterogeneous social contexts are distilled into generic models of local community made    up 
48 
49 
50 of sets of stakeholders whose needs, once understood, can be addressed through    strategies of 
51 
52 CSR and local socioeconomic  development. 
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1 
2 
3 Building on the much longer history of anthropology of development, a growing field    of 
4 
5 ethnographic enquiry has emerged which aims to subject the instruments of this global ethical 
6 
7 
regime – and the actual practices they produce – to empirical investigation. In bringing   a 
8 
9 
10 critical lens to the much-heralded win-win-win that conceptions of global   corporate 
11 
12 citizenship invoke – not only of people, planet and profit, but of local   responsiveness, 
13 
14 national alignment and global values – anthropologists have set out to examine what    lies 
15 
16 behind claims to consensus around the orthodoxies of  sustainable development,   good 
17 
18 
governance and corporate responsibility, and demonstrating how such    multi-stakeholder 
20 
21 processes of ethical governance can equally be liable to corporate capture (Garsten   & 
22 
23 Jacobsson, 2007, Kirsch & Benson, 2010, Rajak, 2011b; Gilberthorpe & Banks,    2012). 
24 
25 Broadly speaking, this work examines corporate efforts to mitigate the impacts of    extraction 
26 
27 
from two vantage points, on the one hand focusing on the apparatus and architecture of the 
28 
29 
30 corporate form (see for example Rajak, 2011a, Kirsch, 2014, Welker, 2014), and on the other 
31 
32 exploring how it is experienced at the local level (see for example, Sawyer, 2004; Li,    2010; 
33 
34 Gardner, 2012; Hoinathy, 2012; Shever, 2012; Gilberthorpe,   2013). 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Across various extractive sites (Newmont’s mining concessions in Ghana and   Peru, 
40 
41 Chevron’s gasfields in Bangladesh and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline) this embryonic    field of 
42 
43 ethnographic research reveals how corporations deploy CSR in pursuit of local compliance, 
44 
45 collaboration and consent    (Gardner, 2012; Muñoz & Burnham, 2016; Sydow, 2016). In each 
46 
47 
case however, CSR produces division and disconnection as much, if    not more than, cohesion 
48 
49 
50 and inclusion. For as Kapelus (2002), Sydow (2016) and Sawyer (2005) all    show in 
51 
52 ethnographic research from contexts as diverse as gold mining in Ghana, titanium mining in 
53 
54 South Africa and oil drilling in Ecuador, the ‘local community’    does not already exist as an 
55 
56 objectively observable (and unified) unit to be identified and approached in pursuit of    consent 
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1 
2 
3 or a ‘social licence’. The processes of identification and social investment are    discursive in 
4 
5 that the community is itself imagined and constructed through these normative processes,    and 
6 
7 
a particular constituency is created in order to provide    the operation with legitimacy and the 
8 
9 
10 local accountability that national resource deals fail to deliver. Indeed    anthropologists 
11 
12 themselves have traditionally been favoured by mining companies looking to deploy    their 
13 
14 knowledge and methods of    participant observation (and the proximity to ‘the people’ they 
15 
16 claim) in the process of identification of and mediation with the so-called   ‘community’ 
17 
18 
(Kapelus, 2002; Kirsch, 2002). Crucial here is the ‘antipolitical’ effect of    community 
20 
21 engagement and investment apparatus as a set of uniform    technologies imposed to discipline 
22 
23 diverse localities and social contexts to corporate agendas (Sydow, 2016). Yet, as    Sydow 
24 
25 notes, this is not always the case. Her comparative analysis of Newmont Mining’s    CSR 
26 
27 
programmes in Peru and Ghana reveals that CSR’s capacity to suspend    politics is contingent, 
28 
29 
30 implicated in local resistances and agency (Sydow,  2016). 
31 
32  
33 
34 Indeed, as Sillitoe and Wilson’s (2003) work at the Porgera Mine in Papua New    Guinea 
35 
36 brings into sharp focus, the consent that is brokered through these processes of    community 
37 
38 
engagement and investment are fragile and the security that is achieved is precarious. For    in 
40 
41 seeking technical solutions to political problems through  increasingly sophisticated tools   of 
42 
43 social impact assessment and engagement, they often serve to further entrench    existing 
44 
45 patterns of inequality and exclusion, through the dispensation of benefits that are    narrowly 
46 
47 
targeted and inevitably exclusionary (Sawyer, 2006; Rajak, 2011a; Sydow, 2016). Thus it    is 
48 
49 
50 the unintended outcomes of such CSR interventions which such work brings to the fore: the 
51 
52 creation of hotspots of development enhancing geographic inequalities, new forms   of 
53 
54 corporate patronage compounding existing hierarchies and divisions which might pit    one 
55 
56 group against another and the potential for undermining local struggles for entitlement,    rights 
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1 
2 
3 and control over resources (see for example, Rajak, 2011a; Gilberthorpe & Banks,    2012; 
4 
5 Kirsch, 2014; Welker,  2014). 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 Both the global instruments of governance and the local content programming have,    in 
11 
12 various ways, sought to mitigate, or bypass, the state as the key arbiter of socioeconomic 
13 
14 benefits and development derived from mineral wealth. As a result, however, they are unable 
15 
16 to address the fundamental and more intractable issues at stake in the resource curse; that is, 
17 
18 
questions about economic sovereignty, national patrimony and who owns (and gets to    benefit 
20 
21 from) mineral resources. Ethnographic research reveals how such technical    interventions for 
22 
23 treating or managing the resource curse at either the    global level or local end can have 
24 
25 unintended outcomes. Ultimately the techniques    of CSR and local engagement which are 
26 
27 
intended to address the local cause and effects of the resource curse, can end    up working as 
28 
29 
30 instruments of divide and rule that serve to enhance inequities and hierarchies in resource rich 
31 
32 areas, deferring the fundamental questions about ownership of resources and    beneficiation, 
33 
34 rather than addressing them. For    while the social licence to extract attempts to circumvent the 
35 
36 deficit of legitimacy underlying the licence to operate agreed by national    governments, it fails 
37 
38 
to address the underlying question of who has the right    to benefit from the process. 
40 
41 
42 
43 Far from offering progressive tools to combat the curse, such initiatives and    instruments can 
44 
45 have the opposite effect. From the oilfields of Ecuador, to the goldmines of Papua    New 
46 
47 
Guinea this strand of critically-engaged anthropology collectively highlights   how 
48 
49 
50 corporations use the language and practice of ethics to contain and respond to different kinds 
51 
52 of challenges and conflicts generated by their activities, from ecological/environmental    crisis, 
53 
54 to labour rights and local expectations of jobs, from dependency and Dutch disease    to 
55 
56 corruption and conflict over resources (Kirsch, 2011; Rajak, 2011a; Welker,    2014; Sydow, 
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1 
2 
3 2016). As CSR serves to better ease the incursion of TNCs and the extraction of local 
4 
5 resources (Sawyer, 2007,p. 7), corporate-community partnerships can provide    new 
6 
7 
channels/vehicles for patronage, elite-acting/corruption, dependency and control  (Jones,   2007; 
8 
9 
10 Welker, 2009; Rajak, 2011a; Gardner, 2012).    By exploring both the intended and unintended 
11 
12 effects of these processes empirically, this body of work shows how, in practice,    the very 
13 
14 same instruments that are proffered as solutions to the resource curse have a   productive 
15 
16 power to re-inscribe relations of authority and dependence between both   extractive 
17 
18 
companies and national governments, as well as development donors, and the localities    in 
20 
21 which they operate. 
22 
23 
24 
25 Conclusion 
26 
27 
Throughout this article we have argued that the anthropology of the resource curse should be 
28 
29 
30 seen more broadly as a process of recontextualising the study of resource extraction    in the 
31 
32 social relations in which it is embedded. We have suggested that the ethnography of    mineral 
33 
34 extractive more broadly should be viewed as a process of humanising what are so   often 
35 
36 conceived as chiefly technocratic or economic enterprises, hard-edged and divorced from    the 
37 
38 
intricate tissue of kinship ties and moral relations. Analysing a multinational    mining company 
40 
41 in terms of personhood, oil exploration in relation to kinship, or corporate   social 
42 
43 responsibility in relation to gift exchange, might at first seem surprising, even jarring. Yet,    as 
44 
45 the ethnographic contributions that we have brought together in this review highlight,    the 
46 
47 
intricate understanding of human relations on which the ethnographic research    focuses, 
48 
49 
50 reveals not only the constellation of both subaltern and elite agency at work within    processes 
51 
52 of resource extraction, but the ways in which they entrench, unsettle or generate new forms of 
53 
54 inequality, friction and dispossession in resource curse affected   areas. 
55 
56 
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1 
2 
3 Crucial to this process of social re-embedding is both a historical    and geographical 
4 
5 recontextualisation which prioritises the temporal and spatial specificities of the local    and 
6 
7 
national contexts in which extraction takes place as key to understanding its effects. Rather 
8 
9 
10 than seeing these specificities as background or “social detail” that elaborate    or add flesh to 
11 
12 the universally applicable model of the resource curse, we suggest that the   intrinsic 
13 
14 embeddedness of mineral extraction (literally rooted in the ground) requires that we invert 
15 
16 that logic, and start, as it were, from the ground  up. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 Part and parcel of this project of recontextualisation is the emphasis on historicising mineral 
22 
23 extraction, and the patterns commonly associated with the resource curse.   Technical 
24 
25 knowledge and economic theory, in any sphere, are commonly held up    as timeless and 
26 
27 
universal (despite being only the best knowledge of their own particular age).    Throughout 
28 
29 
30 this paper we have returned to the anthropological adage continuity and change as    shorthand 
31 
32 for the imperative to study resource extractive at all levels – from illegal gem mining    in 
33 
34 Madagascar to oil futures trading in London – as historically contingent. The result is    to 
35 
36 highlight how ‘the curse’, and the specific adverse effects and destructive practices   of 
37 
38 
resource extraction that have become so entrenched and pervasive, are anything but    the 
40 
41 inevitable outcomes of immutable structures. Thus a fundamental element in   the 
42 
43 anthropology of resource extraction, we argued, has been an emphasis on agency,    to bring 
44 
45 agency back into the picture at both the micro and macro level, and counter    an agentless 
46 
47 
portrait of global resource capitalism that is reproduced as much by    its critics as by the 
48 
49 
50 mainstream technocratic approach to resource  extraction. 
51 
52 
53 
54 Extractive TNCs are often cast in the critical literature as simply the foot soldiers   of 
55 
56 neoliberalism, driven purely by the unyielding ‘logic    of capital’ grinding out its path as it 
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1 
2 
3 seeks to colonise greenfield territories across the globe (Sawyer, 2005; Behrends et al.,    2013). 
4 
5 Such renditions of global resource capitalism, in failing to examine empirically the    specific 
6 
7 
elite agencies that drive and broker processes of extraction, displace agency (and   indeed 
8 
9 
10 causation) onto ‘capital’ itself. Ethnographic accounts of mineral, oil and gas    extraction serve 
11 
12 to challenge stereotypical renditions of global capitalism as a unilinear process of   the 
13 
14 colonisation of greenfield territories across the globe,    and contest the common portrait of 
15 
16 indigenous communities as powerless, passive recipients. In providing an alternative    template 
17 
18 
for confronting empirically transnational processes of extractive capitalism from    multiple 
20 
21 angles, the mobility and flexibility of anthropological research brings into focus   the 
22 
23 connections (and disjunctures) between the articulation of the resource curse as a    globally 
24 
25 applicable paradigm and the situated practices to which it is seen to give rise in   particular 
26 
27 
localities. The role and contribution of anthropology is then, neither restricted to   the 
28 
29 
30 revelation of localised difference to the ways    in which the resource curse is experienced and 
31 
32 contested, nor limited to showing how and where extractive processes have failed because    of 
33 
34 a deficit of local knowledge    or a gap in cultural understanding on behalf of operators and/or 
35 
36 the state. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 This we argue has been, and remains, a political as well as intellectual project, providing    a 
42 
43 lens for examining empirically how agency drives and brokers processes of    extraction at 
44 
45 numerous levels, for tracing routes of causation as much as intended and   unintended 
46 
47 
outcomes. The critical focus on social and historical specificity challenge the abstract    theory 
48 
49 
50 of the resource curse and the teleological vision of    modernisation and development that 
51 
52 underpins it, demanding better, more refined conceptual tools of analysis that are both    more 
53 
54 nuanced and more progressive in their capacity to incorporate the lifeworlds   and 
55 
56 epistemologies of those affected by extractive  industry. 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
This is encapsulated in the statement of the former chairman of Anglo American and Shell to shareholders in 
5 2006: ‘The revenues that we generate are often volatile … and extractive revenues have sometimes been subject 
6 
7 to wholesale embezzlement by government…. Whilst we cannot and should not take on responsibilities that are 
8 properly those of governments, we cannot stand aloof from major governance and social issues in the countries 
9 where we operate’ (Mark Moody-Stuart, Anglo American Annual General Meeting, 25 April 2006). 
10 
11 
2 
Illegal uranium mining in Namibia (Rio Tinto); co-architects of South Africa’s labour repressive apartheid 
12 economy (Anglo American); complicity in the oppression of the Ogoni in Nigeria and the execution of Ken Saro 
13 
14 Wiwa (Shell); complicity with paramilitary outfits in forced relocations in Columbia (BP); environmental 
15 disaster at Brent Spar (Shell again); involvement in the mine-related conflict on Bougainville, Papua New 
16 Guinea (Conzinc Rio Tinto); asbestos poisoning in the Cape (Cape Industries); ChevronTexaco in Angola; 
17 
18 Talisman in Sudan … the list goes on. 
19 
3 
Michael Watts is a geographer who uses anthropological methods to conduct in-depth social analyses 
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4 Sir Robert Wilson, Interview 19th May 2004. 
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